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‘Politics in Uttar Pradesh today is somewhat strange.’2 
‘…if the activists’ behavior seemed strange, it is because one normally 
assumes that their behavior should make sense.’ (Tsebelis 1990: 237) 
 
A B S T R A C T  
 
In this paper, competition between political actors in Uttar Pradesh (UP) is 
conceptualized as defying the commonly held assumptions on political behaviour 
in a democratic state. The party system in UP from 1993 onwards is characterized 
as a highly polarized and fragmented, but at the same time surprisingly stable tri-
polar multi-party system, in which no party or alliance of parties is able to establish 
itself as a dominant political actor, primarily due to the parties’ reliance on 
informal political networks. The argument aims at making a case for a re-
evaluation of Brass’ concept of factionalism (Brass 1965) with special reference to 
the changed and changing relationship between caste and state-level politics. It is 
argued that the behaviour of political actors at the state level is determined to a 
large extent by the process of alliance formation between communities at the 
constituency level aimed at establishing a favourable position for that community 
regarding access to state resources. In this process, community-based homogenous 
voting behaviour of several politically important social groups is linked to the 
formation and maintenance of political networks of support designed to maximize 
benefits for the political actors involved. Under these circumstances, and given the 
almost complete absence of ideological compulsions, political actors display a 
significant amount of flexibility in switching their loyalties between factions and 
parties. The use of caste in politics is conceptualized as primarily strategic and 
based on its relevant organizational properties. 
 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on a MA thesis submitted by Sebastian Schwecke to the Department 
of Political Science, University of Heidelberg, South Asia Institute (E-mail: 
sschwecke1@yahoo.co.in). 
2 Kalyan Singh, cited in Frontline 14 (23), Nov. 15-28, 1997. 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N  
 
Politics in Uttar Pradesh, India’s largest and politically most important state, is 
generally described by foreign and indigenous observers alike as a prime example 
of the crisis into which the Indian political system has slowly descended from the 
late 1960s onwards. Images of the often rather unruly behaviour of UP’s legislators 
strengthen this impression as much as the apparent instability of its coalition 
governments since the breakdown of one party dominance. Meanwhile the state is 
entering into a fiscal crisis that is bound to reduce the state’s economical 
development even further. At the same time Uttar Pradesh is witnessing what 
Yadav (2000) calls the ‘second democratic upsurge’, indicating a significant 
increase in the political participation and representation of lower social groups and 
at least the western part of UP still figures prominently on the list of India’s 
prosperous surplus producing agricultural regions. Political scientists generally 
describe these developments as the result of a process of deinstitutionalization and 
‘reinstitutionalization’ due to the rise of traditionally ‘backward’ groups in society 
that effectively challenged established patterns of political hegemony (Frankel/Rao 
1990; Kohli 1990; Hasan 1998; Chhibber 1999). These descriptions are based on 
applications of the cleavage model (Lipset/Rokkan 1967) highlighting the 
importance of caste and community identities in UP and India, but fail to explain 
the apparent lack of ‘principles’ (both in a moral and in an ideological respect) and 
the high level of flexibility that has become almost a trademark of political 
leadership in UP. 
Politics in Uttar Pradesh since the 1990s has paradoxically been characterized 
by the coexistence of governmental instability and a highly fragmented and 
polarized, but at the same time stable party system that defies all attempts at 
classification using generally accepted concepts of political science. Since the 
overall situation of UP in comparison to developments in other Indian states can 
justifiably be regarded as the result of a ‘somewhat extreme version of … ‘pure 
politics’’ (Hasan 2001: 4008) it is to be expected that an analysis of the political 
actors, their strategies and the structural constraints that determine them is capable 
of providing significant insights into the reasons and origins of the present ‘crisis’ 
and the functioning of the political system in Uttar Pradesh in general. Using a 
combination of Brass’ concept of factionalism (Brass 1965) and the theory of 
citizen-elite linkages in party systems (Lawson 1980) I will argue that politics in 
Uttar Pradesh has to be seen as a rational and stable process that is based primarily 
on highly flexible networks of patronage-oriented relationships between politicians 
and social intermediaries, where the principal aim of political actors is to maximize 
individual gains.3  
                                                 
3 This approach is thus similar in many ways to Mitra’s characterization of political actors 
as entrepreneurs (Mitra 1992). 
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Given the plurality of party systems and political practices in India, comparative 
studies are in danger of becoming mired in regional sub-contexts. To reduce the 
level of complexity I will focus exclusively on Uttar Pradesh. While the results of 
an analysis limited to one Indian state cannot be generalized for the Indian political 
system as a whole, it can be assumed that, given UP’s lack of specifically regional 
cultural characteristics (Brass 1965: 8) and its relative political importance in 
comparison to other states, political developments there exemplify trends 
elsewhere in India to a large degree. 
In this study I will first turn to a description of the functioning of political 
networks based mainly on an evaluation of the importance of caste (jati) for 
politics in UP. The validity of the hypothesis is then tested against the two political 
developments in Uttar Pradesh that are the most difficult to explain using a 
cleavage approach: (1) the frequent formation and breakdown of political alliances 
between political parties, and (2) the inability of the BJP to contain its internal 
power struggles, even though these were expected to diminish its electoral appeal 
to a significant degree and led to a breakdown of the social coalition created during 
the Ayodhya and Mandal controversies.4 
 
CASTE AND POLITICAL NETWORKS IN UTTAR PRADESH 
 
Several authors argue that caste5 has become the predominant factor in UP politics 
after the breakdown of one party dominance, replacing both sectoral and communal 
issues that are said to have dominated the 1980s and early 1990s (Varshney 1995: 
4-5; Chhibber 1999: 157). It is not the political use of jati that is seen as a new 
development, but rather its relative importance compared to other issues (Hasan 
2002: 376). On the other hand, Gupta (2000: 148-176) is cautioning political 
scientists against reducing the complexity of Indian politics to simple caste 
arithmetic.  
Given the primarily local character of caste it should be expected that the 
importance of caste is highest at this level of the political system. Srinivas (1962) 
argues that the functioning of caste in politics has to be seen primarily in form of 
so-called dominant castes, i.e. usually the numerically large and landholding upper 
and middle castes that use traditional social and economical dependencies to gain 
control of the political process at the local level. Kothari (1970) argues that 
numerical majority is not a necessary precondition for political control, given some 
communities’ social and economical status and their tendency to block other 
castes’ access to positions of power. He describes the politically dominant 
communities as ‘entrenched castes’, but also recognizes the importance of 
                                                 
4 The terms Ayodhya and Mandal are commonly used to describe the two highly emotive 
political disputes that dominated the political discourse between the mid-1980s and mid-
1990s and accompanied the decline of the Congress party and the rise of the BJP. 
‘Ayodhya’ refers to the Ramjanmabhumi-Babri Masjid dispute, i.e. the controversy on the 
legitimacy built in the early Mughal period at the alleged birthplace of the Hindu god Ram. 
‘Mandal’ is generally used as a reference to the issue of reservations in public sector 
employment and higher educational institutions for OBCs. 
5 In this study I use the term ‘caste’ as an equivalent to the term ‘jati.’ 
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so-called ascendant castes that challenge the formers’ monopoly as regards control 
of the political system. 
Chhibber (1999: 146-157) argues that in Uttar Pradesh the purely local political 
character of caste was terminated in the 1990s due to the use the Mandal report by 
political parties, which thus created a new cleavage and divided society politically 
in three large caste blocks: Dalits, Other Backward Classes (OBC) and Upper 
Castes, represented in parliament by the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), the 
Samajwadi Party (SP) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) respectively. There are 
some noteworthy difficulties with this approach: While the overall significance of 
the Mandal controversy is generally agreed upon, voting patterns in UP do not 
correspond to this model of social stratification. Given the altogether rather 
marginal impact of reservation policies on economic development for large 
sections of society (Weiner 2001: 205) this approach tends to stress issues of 
identity politics vis-à-vis material interests that centre on access to the state as an 
instrument of patronage. Moreover, it has to be noted that identity (especially in 
rural areas) is defined to a large extent by community membership, i.e. 
membership in a single jati, not by large aggregates. 
The heterogeneity of voting patterns in these large caste blocks is best seen in 
the OBC category in the 1990s, where the BJP and SP gained an almost equal share 
and a large part of the OBC vote actually went to small parties or independents. 
 
Table 1: Voting Behaviour of OBCs in the 1999 Lok Sabha-Elections in UP 
 
 Total SP BJP BSP Congress 
Respondents 442 119 108 42 31 
Percentage 100.00 26.92 24.43 9.50 7.01 
 
(Source: Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) pre-election survey 1999. 
Note that the figures in this survey do not correspond to the actual overall election results, 
where the SP fared better and the Congress worse.) 
 
These figures largely correspond to data provided for most elections throughout the 
1990s and for the Vidhan Sabha-elections 2002 (Misra 1993; Verma 2002). Only 
in the 1996 elections did the Samajwadi Party gain a significantly larger share of 
the OBC vote (India Today, May 31, 1996). 
An analysis of the voting behaviour of some politically important communities 
in Uttar Pradesh shows that the general impression of the three major parties 
representing the Upper Castes, OBCs and Dalits respectively is primarily a result 
of these communities’ homogenous voting behaviour, but does not necessarily 
imply similarly homogenous voting patterns on the basis of caste or caste block 
membership throughout society.  
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Table 2: Community-wise Voting Behaviour in Uttar Pradesh 1999 (%) 
 
 Brahmins Thakurs Banias Jats 
BJP 66.3 53.5 75.6 44.0 
SP 5.3 3.9 - 9.8 
BSP 2.1 0.8 2.4 16.0 
Congress 11.6 16.5 9.8 12.0 
Others 16.7 25.3 12.2 18.2 
 Yadavs Kurmis Lodhs Jatavs 
BJP 7.8 33.3 59.1 2.8 
SP 63.7 12.8 4.5 3.4 
BSP 2.9 3.8 - 69.9 
Congress 2.0 3.8 4.5 12.5 
Others 23.6 46.3 31.9 11.4 
 
(Source: CSDS pre-election survey 1999.) 
 
These communities comprise roughly 45-50 % of the population in UP. Muslims, 
who are seen in this study as a religious community transcending caste identity, 
show a similarly homogenous voting behaviour favouring either the Samajwadi 
Party or the Congress.6 Some numerically relatively insignificant communities also 
show rather homogenous voting patterns, but for most communities this is not the 
case. There is no clear relationship between the occurrences of community-wise 
homogenous voting behaviour and social, educational or economic status attributed 
generally to certain communities. This indicates that homogenous voting is less a 
result of policy preferences or identity, but a strategic political decision. 
The most important aspect common to all communities listed above is their 
numerical strength at least on a sub-regional level, which enables them to influence 
election results in a meaningful way. If communities do not vote homogenously at 
the state level, it does not necessarily have to be because of a lack of politicization, 
but might also indicate a lack of numerical strength or regional concentration, 
which prevents or hinders the development of community-based political strategies 
apart from association with the locally dominant groups. Since even dominant 
groups in UP generally do not have sufficient political strength to determine 
election results on their own, the ability to accommodate politically less organized 
or less important groups, again, constitutes one of the most important aspects in the 
process of alliance formation at the local level. Economic, educational or social 
status are important aspects in so far as they can further a community’s ability to 
build local alliances capable of determining electoral competition. 
At the local or district/constituency level the factors leading to community-wise 
homogenous voting patterns correspond largely to Kothari’s characterization of 
                                                 
6 Due to specific political circumstances at the time it was conducted the CSDS survey 
indicates a higher proportion of Muslim support for the Congress than the SP. In the overall 
situation since 1993, it is nonetheless to be expected that the Samajwadi Party gets a higher 
share of Muslim votes than the Congress.  
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entrenched and ascendant castes.7 It is important to stress that this concept is based 
on the organizational aspects of caste in society and politics under circumstances, 
where the principal aim of political participation is seen as gaining access to state 
resources, and which is not based on identity or class-specific interests. If seen 
from the point of view of competing communities references to jati in politics thus 
constitute a strategic instrument in gaining access to scarce resources by 
establishing dominant political alliances at the constituency level. 
If seen from the point of view of political parties the reliance on caste in a 
competitive electoral political system, too, has to be regarded as a means to 
political power. While community identity certainly plays an important role in 
political mobilisation, it also provides an instrument to prop up the relatively weak 
organizational wings of parties in Uttar Pradesh, especially given the low level of 
membership in politically independent secondary associations capable of acting as 
pressure groups (Chhibber 1999: 69; Kohli 1990: 188-191). Community-wise 
homogenous voting, moreover, enables politicians to focus the flow of patronage 
on supportive communities and thus increases the efficiency of an electoral 
political system based primarily on the reciprocal exchange of votes for patronage. 
In tables 1 and 2 it was shown that there are significant empirical difficulties in 
characterising political competition in UP as a cleavage system based on caste or 
larger groups of castes. Instead, it was proposed that caste is politically relevant in 
Uttar Pradesh mainly because of its organizational properties enabling the 
formation of political alliances at the constituency level. Gupta (2000: 171-176) 
argues in his critique of the prominent use of caste by political scientists that the 
high instability of electoral outcomes especially at this level indicates the relatively 
low importance of caste vis-à-vis other political issues. The argument is 
convincing, if an analysis is reduced to simple ‘caste arithmetic’. On the other 
hand, instability of electoral outcomes can be seen as the result of the high 
flexibility of communities and parties in the process of competitive alliance 
formation, which is shown in table 3. 
 
Table 3: Held Seats Lost, Newly Won and Retained Seats in the Vidhan 
Sabha-elections 2002 
 
 BJP SP BSP Congress Others 
Held Seats Lost 100 50 33 27 20 
Retained Seats 54 59 29 4 27 
Newly Won Seats 34 84 69 21 22 
(Source: Verma 2002) 
 
The low rate of success of sitting candidates shown in table 3 is generally 
interpreted as an indication of the relatively low level of institutionalization of the 
                                                 
7 Given the political strength of socially disadvantaged communities like Jatavs and Yadavs 
in contemporary Uttar Pradesh a continued distinction between entrenched and ascendant 
castes seems unnecessary, unless it refers to communities whose political importance is not 
yet established. 
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party system in UP. This is at odds with the overall stability of the party system 
since 1993, which can be measured through the aggregate number of seats and vote 
shares of the 3 main parties. 
 
Table 4: Aggregate Number of Seats and Vote Share of BJP, SP and BSP since 
1993 
 
 1993 1996 2002 
Seats 352 (83.4) 351 (82.6) 329 (81.8) 
Vote Share (%) 62.4 73.9 68.7 
 
(Source: Election Commission of India 1993; 1996a; 2002. The figures in parentheses 
indicate the percentages of seats in the Vidhan Sabha held by the three main parties.) 
 
If seen as indicators of party system institutionalization and stability, table 3 
and table 4 show a paradox situation of a low level of institutionalization at the 
constituency level coexisting with a highly stable and institutionalized party system 
at the state level. The situation is compounded even further, since the high 
flexibility shown by the voters at the constituency level is not the result of 
increased polarisation between the winning and the second (or even third) 
candidates. Instead, there is a marked tendency of reduced average vote shares by 
all main candidates. 
 
Table 5: Average Vote Shares of Candidates (%) 1996-2002 
 
 1st Candidate 2nd Candidate 3rd Candidate Others 
1996 40.56 30.61 20.91 7.92 
1998 39.68 31.28 20.03 9.01 
1999 36.55 29.26 19.87 14.32 
2002 35.01 27.10 18.35 19.54 
 
(Calculations based on Election Commission of India 1996a; 1998; 1999; 2002.) 
 
If politics in UP is seen as based primarily on issues of caste identity, the 
emergence of a stable, polarised party system, and, given the decreasing average 
vote shares of the main candidates, the establishment of successful alternative 
parties should have been expected. This has not been the case. Neither the 
Congress nor newly founded parties like Apna Dal (AD) or Kalyan Singh’s 
Rashtriya Kranti Party (RKP) have been able to successfully challenge the 
predominance of the three main parties. The high instability of voting behaviour at 
the constituency level and the overall loss of the main candidates’ vote share have 
to be seen not as results of caste-based identity politics, but in the light of the 
organizational properties of caste vis-à-vis political competition. 
Chhibber (1999: 60-61) argues that so-called caste associations play an 
altogether relatively minor role in politics and are not likely to act as effective 
pressure groups on parties. Apart from formal associations caste is seen to affect 
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politics rather informally. In compliance with Brass’ description of political 
factions in Uttar Pradesh (Brass 1965), it can be argued that caste allows the 
establishment of informal networks of relationships between communities and 
politicians, but (under the prevailing circumstances) not of stable patterns of 
support that characterize cleavages. The informality of these networks reduces the 
associational compulsions of electoral politics to a degree that allows both 
politicians and community leaders a high level of flexibility in alliance formation. 
The rationality of political behaviour is not focussed on parties, but centred on sub-
groups of political actors defined primarily by caste membership. Alliance 
formation at the constituency level corresponds to Riker’s concept of minimal 
winning coalitions (Riker 1962), but these minimal winning coalitions do not 
necessarily have to be based on stable party loyalties of either politicians or 
community leaders. The inability of the major parties (and especially the BJP) to 
prevent internal leadership conflicts led to a significant increase in party system 
fragmentation from the late 1990s onwards that can be measured through the 
effective number of parties at the constituency level.8 
 
Table 6: Effective Number of Parties in Uttar Pradesh (Constituency-wise) 
1996-2002 
 
1996 1998 1999 2002 
3.24 3.27 3.67 4.10 
 
(Calculations based on Election Commission of India 1996a; 1998; 1999; 2002.) 
 
The decrease in winning candidates’ vote shares indicates a related decrease in 
the size of alliances expected to be minimally winning at the constituency level. 
Given the patronage-oriented nature of politics in Uttar Pradesh the decreasing size 
of minimal winning coalitions actually increases the gains expected by political 
actors, especially community leaders. Under these circumstances, homogenous 
voting behaviour of some communities forms an effective instrument in 
establishing political predominance. The strength of the three major parties in Uttar 
Pradesh rests mainly in their ability to maintain their support from networks 
consisting of some specific politically important communities. The inability of 
smaller parties to challenge the three parties’ dominance effectively is related to 
these communities’ continued support, which prevents to a large degree the 
formation of alternative minimal winning coalitions. 
At the same time, political competition based on community-wise homogenous 
voting behaviour and relatively small minimal winning coalitions offers significant 
incentives for defections from previously established alliances, thus leading to 
increasing instability at the local or constituency level. At the state level the 
triangular character of the party system results in a lack of clear parliamentary 
                                                 
8 The effective number of parties is measured according to Laakso and Taagepera (1979) as 
1/Σ pi² with p as the decimal vote percentages of all parties i either in the constituencies or 
in the legislature. It thus provides an indication of the number of relevant political parties. 
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majorities, unless two of the three main parties cooperate. Incentives for defection 
of legislators are high, but given the continued predominance of the main parties 
based on the electoral support of key communities, gains from defections are 
generally rather short-termed.9 This explains the ostensibly rather paradoxical 
situation of a stable party system, but a highly instable process of government 
formation. 
I have used the relatively neutral term communities, since political networks in 
Uttar Pradesh do not necessarily have to be based on caste membership alone. 
Brass (1965) stresses the relevance of factions, i.e. political networks based on 
personal loyalties rather than issues or identities. The strategic use of religious 
identities has been well documented (Freitag 1989; Basu 2001; Jaffrelot 1998a; 
Dyke 1997). Varshney (1995: 118-120) highlights the importance of agrarian 
identity in the campaigns of the Bharatiya Kisan Union (BKU) and the various 
organizations of Charan Singh. It is generally expected that the formation of 
political networks involves several factors simultaneously, including (most 
explicitly during the Mandal controversy) caste block solidarities. 
The role of communities in politics in UP should be differentiated from that of 
so-called vote banks in the period of one party-dominance. The complexity and 
flexibility of political networks allow a significant degree of freedom to 
manoeuvre, which can be used in the process of political bargaining by several 
communities (or their leaders), irrespective of traditional social hierarchies and 
economic dependence. 
In the following sections the hypothesis that political competition in Uttar 
Pradesh is based on informal political networks originating from the constituency 
level is tested against two cases: the regular breakdown of political alliances 
between major parties and the inability of the BJP to maintain the electoral support 
gained during the Ayodhya campaigns in the early 1990s. 
 
T H E  F O R M A T I O N  A N D  B R E A K D O W N  O F  C O A L I T I O N S  I N  
U T T A R  P R A D E S H  
 
The frequency of so-called hung assemblies in Uttar Pradesh since the breakdown 
of one party-dominance ensured the formation of several coalitions in the state 
from 1989 onwards, which varied widely in their degree of formality.10 In fact, if 
the support given to the Mulayam Singh Yadav-led governments between 1989 and 
1991 is included, alliances have been formed between all important parties, except 
between the BJP and the Congress. With the exception of the period between 1991 
and 1992 all governments were either coalitions or minority governments. No 
government in Uttar Pradesh lasted its full term. The BJP-led coalition government 
                                                 
9 This can be seen in the case of the BSP, whose parliamentary wing split in 1995, 1997 and 
1998, but which still managed to consolidate or strengthen its position in all succeeding 
elections. 
10 Since the impact of alliances between political parties on state politics is clearly unrelated 
to their degree of formality the term coalition is used in this study as referring to all kinds 
of institutionalized support between parties, including informal seat adjustments or outside 
support to minority governments. 
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between late 1997 and early 2002 was the longest-lasting by far, but was headed by 
three different Chief Ministers and was replaced under dubious circumstances for a 
few days in early 1998 by a minority government of its smaller coalition partners. 
To reduce the level of complexity I will focus in this study on coalitions 
between the three major parties in Uttar Pradesh. Given India’s first-past-the-post 
electoral system political scientists would generally assume the emergence of a 
bipolar party system. Sridharan (1997: 10-12; 2002: 490-491) argues that this is, in 
fact, the case in most Indian states, if party systems are analysed at the constituency 
level, but expressly cites UP as a case which does not correspond to Duverger’s 
Law. Wyatt (1998) analyses the lack of alliance formation in the 1998 Lok Sabha 
elections using Riker’s concept of minimal winning coalitions. According to him 
the lack of cooperation especially between the two weaker parties (SP and BSP) 
has to be seen as the result of long-term strategic interests of both parties, aiming 
towards elimination of the other. Both authors are concerned primarily with pre-
electoral alliances, especially since the lack of these defies generally held 
assumptions of political scientists. 
On the other hand, if the lack of pre-electoral alliances is explained as a result 
of strategic or policy-related incompatibilities between the parties, the frequent 
formation and short duration of post-electoral alliances poses an equally interesting 
puzzle. If the parties in any post-electoral situation saw advantages in alliance 
formation despite incompatibilities that prevented a pre-electoral coalition, why did 
these alliances generally break up within a short period? If party incompatibilities 
are issue-based (rather than indicating mere political strategy) and parties did 
cooperate in spite of these incompatibilities, a decision leading to a highly instable 
process of government formation and  to a state of governance pre-occupied to a 
large degree with questions of coalition maintenance, why does the party system 
remain altogether stable showing no signs of an emergence of new alternatives? 
The argument proposed here is that the puzzle of alliance formation in Uttar 
Pradesh can be conceived as a rational process, if the primary concern of politics in 
UP is regarded as one determined by the formation and maintenance of coalitions 
based on informal networks linking politicians and community leaders. 
All political alliances between major political parties since 1993 were formed 
primarily to prevent one of the contending parties to achieve a dominant position in 
the party system. In this regard all these alliances proved surprisingly successful in 
spite of their short durations. The SP-BSP alliance remains the only pre-electoral 
alliance between the three major parties in any general election since 1993. The 
alliance successfully prevented the BJP from coming to power once again. What is 
more, both parties established themselves as powerful political contenders in UP 
especially vis-à-vis the Congress and the Janata Dal (JD). The following post-poll 
coalition was heralded by many observers as the eclipse of Mandal politics, the 
unification of the lower castes to challenge the traditional upper caste hegemony. 
At the same time, it seemed to indicate that the BJP’s efforts at social engineering 
through communal mobilization had not succeeded in gaining the support of the 
socially lower-rated Hindu communities. Within a few months, however, the 
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coalition entered into an enduring crisis that finally led to its collapse in early June 
1995.11 
It is clear that instead of being an issue-based coalition of the lower castes and 
minorities the principal interest shared by the two parties was a common desire to 
establish itself in the party system. In the circumstances of 1993 both parties, 
moreover, perceived the BJP and the Congress to be their main political enemies. 
The latter’s disintegration and the BJP’s stagnation removed this common thread 
and led to a situation, where both partners aimed at emerging as the only viable 
alternative to the BJP. From the outset both parties chose to achieve this through 
confrontation (Jaffrelot 1998b). The definite refusal to cooperate is difficult to 
explain using a cleavage model, since both parties had proved to be capable of 
mobilizing their respective supporters and the alliance had proved to be rather 
successful not only in the 1993 general elections, but also in several by-elections 
afterwards (Pai 2000: 87).12 
The coalition can be depicted as a game where at least one player’s payoffs 
resemble a deadlock situation. 
 
Figure 1: Depiction of the SP-BSP Coalition as a 2-Person Game 
 
  SP 
  C D 
C 3 1  
BSP D 4 2 
 
The players’ preferences (payoffs) are marked in descending order for the row player 
and in ascending order for the column player, i.e. the most preferred outcome is 
marked with the highest number for the BSP and the lowest for the SP. The payoffs 
depicted in this game indicate the following cases: 
C/C: The coalition continues with both players cooperating. The alliance is likely to 
establish itself as the dominant political formation in Uttar Pradesh. The BSP 
establishes its position within the alliance vis-à-vis the SP. 
C/D: The SP emerges as the principal alternative to the BJP. If the alliance 
continues, the BSP is reduced gradually to the role of a junior partner. 
D/C: The BSP gradually increases its strength vis-à-vis the SP. If the alliance 
continues, the BSP emerges as the principal alternative to the BJP. 
D/D: The coalition collapses. Given its previous dominance, the SP expects to be 
able to establish itself as the principal alternative to the BJP. The BSP has to form an 
alliance against the SP to secure its position in the party system. 
Note that D/D is the only stable case in this game. In all other cases one player gains 
an incentive to switch strategies, if the game is played repeatedly. 
 
Temporary cooperation between the two parties can be explained through the 
use of Tsebelis’ concept of nested games (Tsebelis 1990), indicating that both 
                                                 
11 The SP-BSP alliance still remains the most successful coalition between two major 
parties in UP in terms of continuation in office (18 months). 
12 Srivastava (1996) argues in his study of Kanpur constituency that there was only a 
negligible vote transfer between Dalits and OBCs in favour of the SP-BSP alliance’s 
common candidates. Still, the alliance managed to emerge as the primary choice for 
Muslim voters and can thus be seen as at least moderately compatible. 
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players are simultaneously engaged in different games (most notably their 
competition with the BJP), so that in order to increase their overall gains they may 
choose a strategy that does not maximize their minimal gains in the above depicted 
game. Nevertheless, mutual defection constitutes the equilibrium outcome in this 
game. Both players are expected to opt for defection, as soon as the overall 
situation allows this. The SP’s payoffs correspond to a deadlock situation, while 
the BSP’s correspond to a prisoners’ dilemma. The latter’s strategy thus aims at 
minimizing the party’s risks, while for the SP defection is preferable to cooperation 
in any case. In real political competition, where both players are simultaneously 
engaged in several political conflicts and graded responses are possible, it is to be 
expected that cooperation between the two parties will be restricted to the smallest 
possible extent, unless the overall situation is conducive to complete defection. The 
local elections in 1995, where the SP established itself as the most important party 
in Uttar Pradesh at the local level, thus enabled the formation of a BJP-BSP 
alliance to prevent the SP from reaching a dominant position in the overall party 
system. 
The alliances between the BJP and the BSP in 1995 and 1997 followed a 
similar pattern. Mutual confrontation led to the alliance’s collapse as soon as the 
common aim of preventing the SP’s control of the state’s administration was 
realized. Three aspects are especially noteworthy: (1) the influence of the BJP 
national leadership on the political strategies adopted by the state party unit, (2) the 
attempts to induce incentives for mutual cooperation into the 1997 coalition 
agreement and (3) the intensification of factional infighting in the BJP state unit. 
The third of these aspects will be analysed separately in the following chapter. 
The role of the BJP national leadership in Uttar Pradesh politics is related to the 
issue of factional conflicts within the party at the state as well as the national level. 
At the same time a clear dividing line between the national leadership and the party 
section in UP never existed. To reduce complexity the analysis will focus 
exclusively on specific instances where the national leadership’s influence on 
political strategy in UP was decisive for the process of alliance formation and 
where it appeared to be relatively unified in its perception of interests. The state 
unit’s view is identified with the faction led by Kalyan Singh, which remained 
politically decisive until the late 1990s and was also rather consistently opposed to 
the national leadership’s proposals. 
The national leadership’s position towards alliance formation in Uttar Pradesh 
can be summed up as follows: While it was aware of the risks involved in any 
engagement with the BSP, it valued a coalition with the party on the grounds that 
(a) it might undo the party’s upper caste image to some degree and attract Dalit 
votes, possibly even in UP but especially in other Indian states, and (b) that it 
might enable the party to form a government at the national level either by ensuring 
a sufficient number of seats from UP through an electoral alliance with the BSP, 
which is generally seen as being capable of transferring its votes to any alliance 
partner, or by providing another coalition partner at the national level in case this 
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was needed.13 It has to be added that the existence of a ‘friendly’ state government 
in Uttar Pradesh is generally seen as an important factor in the formation or 
maintenance of national governments, even though the actual impact might be 
exaggerated. The BJP had used the Kalyan Singh-led government in 1991 and 
1992 effectively in the later stages of its Ayodhya campaign. 
It is important to note that the differences between national and state level 
political leaders within the BJP are not issue-based, but related exclusively to 
political strategy. The Kalyan Singh faction in the BJP was not averse to 
cooperation with the BSP in 1995. Cooperation was perceived as an opportunity to 
challenge the SP’s increasing clout and, at the same time, offered a chance to either 
split the BSP (similar to the way the SP attempted) or otherwise ensure BJP 
predominance in a coalition agreement through the party’s superior strength in 
parliament. Political observers noted significant attempts to ‘win over’ Mayawati 
and isolate Kanshi Ram within the BSP. Kanshi Ram’s reassertion within the 
BSP’s state unit was seen as an important factor leading to the coalition’s collapse 
after just a few months (Frontline 12 (21), Oct. 7-20, 1995). Seen against this the 
BJP national leadership was interested primarily in an electoral agreement with an 
organizationally intact BSP. 
The coalition agreement between BJP and BSP in 1997 included measures 
appearing to induce cooperation between the alliance partners, most notably the 
rotation of the Chief Minister’s office between Mayawati and Kalyan Singh. The 
agreement indicates the clearest instance of the BJP national leadership’s 
engagement in UP politics, since consultations were apparently kept secret from 
state party leaders and the results almost exclusively reflected the perceptions of 
the party’s national leadership, forcing even Kalyan Singh to cooperate with the 
BSP for the first period of rotation. Despite these steps, cooperation lasted only for 
the shortest possible period, i.e. until shortly before the end of Mayawati’s turn in 
office. The alliance collapsed after 7 months, with the Kalyan Singh-led faction 
prevailing over the national leadership’s reluctance against attempts to split the 
BSP. 
In the overall analysis the process of coalition formation and maintenance 
between BJP and BSP in 1995 and 1997 can be depicted as a game that shows 
significant similarities to the above mentioned description of the SP-BSP coalition. 
Both the BSP’s and the BJP state unit’s payoffs correspond to a deadlock situation, 
while for the BJP national leadership the payoffs correspond to a prisoners’ 
dilemma, thus leading to a sub-optimal equilibrium outcome for the latter. It seems 
safe to propose on the basis of the cases analysed here that alliance formation 
between major parties in UP as an abstract process can be depicted as a game, 
where at least one player’s payoffs correspond to a deadlock situation, thus 
preventing mutual cooperation unless parties are temporarily compelled to 
                                                 
13 In the 1996 general elections the BJP as the largest party was invited to form the 
government, but failed in forming one due to the lack of support from smaller parties. If the 
alliance in UP would have lasted, the BSP’s support might have been a crucial factor in the 
‘numbers game’ at the national level. 
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cooperate through an overall political situation that can be characterized as 
‘nested’, i.e. through games played simultaneously. 
The question to be answered is why mutual defection is not only the 
equilibrium outcome, but in many cases even the collectively optimal solution in 
coalition formation between major political parties in UP, especially given the 
paradoxical situation of the state’s fractured party system coexisting with a first-
past-the-post electoral system, which is expected to lead to bipolarity. 
The rationality of stable coalition building in such an electoral system is based 
on the assumption that the political actors’ strengths are relatively fixed, since they 
are based on issue-related preferences of individual voters and party discipline is 
enforced by associational compulsions. Under these circumstances defection as a 
strategy can only be of advantage on a short-term basis. In Uttar Pradesh parties’ 
support bases are highly flexible. The process of coalition building here involves 
more than a shared interest in government formation, because parties that remain in 
opposition are risking being denied access to state largesse, which is instrumental 
in maintaining their support in society. This enables other parties to damage a 
rival’s base through ‘poaching’, ultimately allowing even strategies aiming towards 
‘elimination’ of competing parties. On the other hand, coalition formation involves 
a similar risk of ‘poaching’ for both parties involved at the hands of their respective 
alliance partner. 
If parties are seen to represent specific cleavages in society, their support base 
has to be rather constant. While they may be kept outside government temporarily, 
they do not have to fear ‘elimination’. This can, on the other hand, be explained, if 
party support is seen to be based on informal political networks, which are flexible 
enough to switch their loyalty between parties. ‘Casteism’, if interpreted as 
community-wise homogenous voting behaviour, thus represents the main reason 
for party system stability in Uttar Pradesh. The communities which form the basis 
of the political networks through homogenous voting ensure a certain amount of 
stability, since politicians depending on their support are prevented from switching 
party loyalty unless a large part of the respective community (or their political 
leadership) at least at the constituency level agrees to this decision. 
The flexibility of party support bases in Uttar Pradesh can also be seen in the 
infighting within the BJP, which accompanied and in many ways precipitated the 
party’s downslide from a position approaching predominance in terms of seats after 
the 1998 general elections to the apparently weakest link in the ruling coalition in 
late 2002. 
 
T H E  D E C L I N E  O F  T H E  B J P  I N  U T T A R  P R A D E S H  
 
The BJP established itself as the strongest party in Uttar Pradesh in the relatively 
short period between 1989 and 1991. While the party’s growth in this period was 
obviously linked to its communal agenda and the Ramjanmabhumi movement, 
several authors argue that the accompanying Mandal controversy was more 
instrumental in establishing its base especially among the upper castes (Basu 1996; 
Hasan 1998; Chhibber 1999). The BJP vote share stagnated between 1992 and 
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1997 at roughly 32-33 %, but increased significantly in the 1998 Lok Sabha 
elections to slightly above 36 %. Since then, the party has been steadily declining 
and slid to the position of the third largest party behind the SP and the BSP in the 
2002 Vidhan Sabha elections. 
 
Table 7: BJP Vote Shares 1989-2002 (%) 
 
Lok Sabha Vidhan Sabha 
1989 7.6 1989 11.6 
1991 32.8 1991 31.5 
1996 33.4 1993 33.4 
1998 36.5 1996 32.5 
1999 27.6 2002 20.1 
 
(Source: Butler/Lahiri/Roy 1995; Election Commission of India 1993; 1996a; 1996b; 1998; 
1999; 2002) 
 
The party’s downslide is generally attributed to internal infighting between the 
‘pro-OBC’ Kalyan Singh-led faction and several other factions led by Kalraj 
Mishra, Rajnath Singh and Lalji Tandon respectively, which were dominated by 
upper castes, especially Brahmins and Thakurs (Rangarajan 2000). In late 1999 
these conflicts culminated in the expulsion of Kalyan Singh from the BJP and his 
replacement as Chief Minister with Ram Prakash Gupta. Factional infighting 
continued unabated even afterwards, attributed mainly to Brahmin-Thakur rivalry.  
The downslide of the BJP presents another paradox in UP politics. The extent 
of damage to the party’s electoral prospects caused by the internal power struggles 
at the state and, given the overall importance of Uttar Pradesh, also at the national 
level, was rather accurately predicted in the media already in 1999. Thus it was in 
all probability known to all principal actors. Under these circumstances the BJP 
leadership’s continuing failure to accommodate conflicting interests within the 
party poses a serious puzzle to any analysis of politics in UP. Before turning 
toward an examination of the rationality underlying these developments it is 
necessary to provide a chronological summary of factional conflicts within the BJP 
in Uttar Pradesh. 
The BJP established itself in UP in the 1989 elections, in which the party had a 
seat adjustment arrangement with the Mulayam Singh Yadav-led Janata Dal. It 
came to power on its own in the 1991 elections in the wake of the Ayodhya 
agitations. The state government was dismissed in late 1992 after the demolition of 
the Babri Masjid. With the electoral appeal of its communal mobilisation 
diminished, the BJP used its public image as a cadre- and ideology-based 
disciplined organization, drawing its inspiration primarily from the ‘apolitical’ 
RSS, to present itself as an alternative to the instability and corruption associated 
with both the Congress and the various successors to the united Janata Dal. 
Infighting within the BJP in Uttar Pradesh started already in 1994, when the SP 
induced the defection of several BJP MLAs during the budget session (Frontline 12 
(1), Dec.31, 1994-Jan. 13, 1995). The decision to support a BSP-led government 
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then led to a significant intensification of factional conflicts. Dissatisfaction among 
party leaders was as instrumental in ensuring the withdrawal of support to the 
Mayawati government as the latter’s own assertion vis-à-vis the BJP. After the 
1996 Vidhan Sabha elections, which resulted in a ‘hung parliament’, the Kalyan 
Singh-led faction stalled any attempts to form another coalition with the BSP for 
almost 6 months. In early 1997 the BJP national leadership bypassed opposition 
within the state unit through secret negotiations with the BSP. As already 
mentioned above, the terms of the coalition agreement prevented Kalyan Singh 
from sabotaging the alliance prior to the end of the first rotational period. After 
replacing Mayawati as Chief Minister in autumn 1997, Kalyan Singh proceeded to 
heighten tensions within the coalition and, with the help of Rajnath Singh, 
managed to split the BSP and other parties. The perceived ‘pro-OBC-policies’ of 
the government led to increased power struggles between various state level 
leaders, most notably Kalyan Singh, Kalraj Mishra, Lalji Tandon and Rajnath 
Singh. After the latter switched sides to form an upper caste factional block 
together with Mishra and Tandon, the pressure on the national leadership to replace 
Kalyan Singh as Chief Minister grew. At the same time, tensions between the 
upper caste leaders prevented the emergence of a consensus candidate. 
Nevertheless, Kalyan Singh was increasingly marginalized in the candidate 
selection process for the 1999 general elections, and retaliated by encouraging 
dissidents and campaigning only for candidates belonging to his faction. The 
significant losses of the BJP in UP between 1998 and 1999 and the emergence of 
A. B. Vajpayee as the party’s main public face resulted in a consolidation of the 
national leadership’s position vis-à-vis Kalyan Singh, who was regarded both as an 
Advani loyalist and the party’s most charismatic leader in UP. In late 1999 Kalyan 
Singh was replaced as Chief Minister by Ram Prakash Gupta, a previously rather 
unknown ‘consensus candidate’, and expelled from the party. 
Apart from the question of alliance formation different approaches toward 
‘social engineering’ are generally regarded to form the main issue in the internal 
power struggles. Given the party’s strong support base of upper castes and its 
unwillingness to accommodate Muslim interests the strategic options of the BJP to 
broaden its social base included continued efforts to mobilize the religious majority 
as an electoral block, accommodation of Dalit interests through supporting the 
BSP, and inclusion of selected OBC communities in a social coalition with the 
upper castes. The infighting within the BJP was thus projected as the result of 
significant differences between various factions vis-à-vis the latter two options. 
This interpretation of events is, once more, based primarily on identity politics. 
Given the importance of upper caste opposition towards the implementation of 
reservation policies for the consolidation of the BJP vote base in the early 1990s, 
which was mainly aimed at preventing the loss of their traditional dominance over 
politics and administration, upper caste resistance to a BJP Chief Minister 
favouring OBCs (most notably Lodhs), neatly fitted into explanatory models 
highlighting the significance of the Mandal controversy. This position neglects 
both organizational and strategic issues related to the infighting within the BJP and 
fails to explain several political developments, especially the party’s agreement to 
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the formation of a coalition as a junior partner of the BSP after the 2002 elections. 
Using a Rational Choice approach, the decision to abandon the relatively 
successful strategy of including selected OBC communities into an upper caste-
dominated support base (responsible to a significant degree for the electoral 
success in 1996 and 1998) in favour of a high risk strategy centring on cooperation 
with a party perceived as projecting Dalit interests poses serious analytical 
difficulties. Moreover, even in 2002 the BJP continued to attract voters from OBC 
communities. 
 
Table 8: BJP Support by Community/Community Block 2002 (%) 
 
Upper Castes Yadav More Backward Most Backward 
64.3 7.6 51.5 31.6 
Jatav Other SCs Muslim Other 
1.7 11.6 9.6 15.0 
 
(Source: Verma 2002. The data includes votes won by BJP allies. Kurmis and Lodhs form 
the ‘More Backward’ category, while the remaining OBC communities excluding Yadavs 
fall under the ‘Most Backward’ category.) 
 
Table 7 shows that even after the exit of Kalyan Singh the BJP relied heavily on 
support of selected OBC communities. The puzzle of factional conflicts within the 
BJP thus cannot be reduced to animosities based on social identities. 
Instead, the developments within the BJP from the mid-1990s onwards can be 
explained as the result of rational processes, if political competition is seen to be 
based on highly flexible political networks, which aim towards reaching and 
maintaining access to state patronage, without being significantly constricted by 
ideological and/or associational compulsions. Keeping in mind Riker’s concept of 
minimal winning coalitions, under these circumstances rational political actors are 
expected to form coalitions that strive towards an optimal ratio between votes or 
influence and rewards for political participation. Given the lack of issue-based 
constraints on alliance formation between informal networks representing social 
coalitions at the constituency level, political competition both between and within 
parties is high. At the same time, incentives for cooperation both between and 
within parties are small, since political actors can easily shift their allegiances 
either to place themselves in a more favourable position or to prevent a rival or 
competing group from achieving one. 
Political competition within the BJP from the mid-1990s until 1999 was 
marked by efforts of the Kalyan Singh-led faction to reach and maintain a 
predominant position vis-à-vis rivalling factions. Kalyan Singh was chosen in 1991 
as the party’s first Chief Minister in Uttar Pradesh in order to present an OBC 
leader to the public, thus helping the party to sidestep on its less than supportive 
attitude towards reservation policies and gain acceptance among OBC communities 
that perceived themselves to be excluded from the benefits of reservations 
(Zérinini-Brotel 1998: 78-81). Perceived to be a loyalist of the then BJP president 
L. K. Advani and ideologically seen as a hardliner due to his role in the Ayodhya 
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campaign, his position was first challenged seriously after the reassertion of A. B. 
Vajpayee in the mid-1990s, which also marked the beginning of a period of 
moderation within the party,14 at first mainly by political leaders representing 
Brahmin-dominated factions. The break-up of the SP/BSP coalition and the BJP’s 
later failure to prevent the latter from establishing itself as the third major party in 
UP significantly altered the power equations within the party, since the possibility 
of coalition formation with the BSP removed Kalyan Singh’s indispensability as 
the party’s only credible lower caste leader by offering the chance of an upper 
caste-Dalit (or rather Brahmin-Thakur-Jatav) alliance excluding OBCs. Thus, by 
late 1996 his position had been reduced to that of one faction leader among several. 
To the above mentioned description of the BJP/BSP alliances as a game where 
at least one player’s preferences correspond to a deadlock situation can thus be 
added a further dimension of power struggles within the BJP. For the Kalyan 
Singh-led group, any cooperation with the BSP or any other party with a significant 
presence among lower castes in UP would have led to a situation, where the 
group’s position within the party is diminished vis-à-vis upper caste-dominated 
groups that constituted the bulk of the party’s support base in Uttar Pradesh 
throughout the 1990s. At the same time, acceptance of the status quo within the 
BJP state unit by these latter factions would have led to reduced rewards for these 
politicians’ support, which would have threatened the continuing maintenance of 
their political networks. Under these circumstances, cooperation with the BSP 
constitutes both a sub-optimal preference for the party as an entity and the optimal 
preference for the upper caste-dominated factions within the BJP state unit, unless 
the situation is seen as a ‘nested’ game including rivalry among the latter groups as 
well. 
Given the national BJP leadership’s preferences as depicted above regarding 
alliance formation with the BSP, attempts to induce cooperation are to be expected 
in order to avoid a prisoners’ dilemma situation of sub-optimal equilibriums, but 
these led to an increasing confrontation with the Kalyan Singh-led group. 
Moreover, the party’s focus on Vajpayee, whose position within the party reached 
a climax in the late 1990s, as its prime ministerial candidate in the national 
elections 1998 and 1999, endangered the perception of Kalyan Singh as the party’s 
primary vote-catcher in UP, further diminishing the latter’s stature vis-à-vis his 
rivals. While establishing Kalyan Singh’s superior electoral appeal in regard to 
other political leaders in the state, his decision to ‘sabotage’ the party’s electoral 
appeal and the huge losses in terms of votes and seats between 1998 and 1999 
nevertheless compelled the national BJP leadership to reassert its authority and led 
to his expulsion from the party shortly after the elections. 
The continuation of internal power struggles after the exit of Kalyan Singh 
shows that the developments described above cannot be reduced to mere upper 
caste-OBC rivalry. In fact, competition between upper caste-dominated factions 
was seen as one of the main factors enabling Kalyan Singh to continue as Chief 
                                                 
14 Basu (2001) argues that the BJP, as a party that combines features of a radical mass 
movement with those of a moderate political party, alternates between periods of 
radicalization and moderation. 
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Minister until late 1999. Inter-factional rivalry was instrumental in the replacement 
of Ram Prakash Gupta by Rajnath Singh, continued throughout the latter’s term as 
Chief Minister and compelled Kalraj Mishra to step down as the BJP state unit 
president after the 2002 Vidhan Sabha elections (The Hindu, 2 June 2002). In late 
2002 dissidence among second rung leaders belonging mainly to the Thakur 
community severely threatened the state unit’s cohesion and stability and may yet 
lead to the collapse of the present BSP/BJP government (Frontline 19 (23), Nov. 9-
22, 2002). 
These developments cannot be reduced to animosities based on caste identities 
or issues like reservation policies. Thakurs have been wooed both as voters and 
legislators by the SP from the mid-1990s onwards with rather mixed responses 
ranging from the defection of Amar Singh and the moderate electoral support 
gained in the local elections in 2000 to almost complete consolidation of the 
community in support of the BJP (Pai 2000: 69). Kalyan Singh became Chief 
Minister at a time when the upper caste-dominated BJP had its own majority in the 
Legislative Assembly and the Mandal controversy was at its climax and was 
expelled from the party at a time when animosities between upper castes and OBCs 
and within the OBC category were clearly decreasing.  
Rather, the BJP’s downslide, resulting from a failure to accommodate factional 
interests, can be described as a rational process, if it is accepted that (1) political 
actors’ allegiances are primarily based on rewards gained through association with 
political networks (or factions) rather than parties, (2) that these networks are 
linked to specific social communities through the latter’s strategic use of 
homogenous voting, which enables both access to and dispersion of state-
controlled resources, and (3) that these networks possess a significant degree of 
flexibility in alliance formation even outside party organizations. Actions of 
politicians that damage their own party’s prospects can thus be explained through 
benefits of the politicians’ networks of support without the need to take recourse to 
analyses based on personal animosities between political leaders related to either 
their social backgrounds or their previous conduct and misconduct, which may be 
strategically used but can also be shelved in order to further political interests. The 
campaign to remove Kalyan Singh as Chief Minister and his retaliation in 1999 and 
the factional tussles between Rajnath Singh and Kalraj Mishra before the 2002 
elections severely damaged the electoral performances of the BJP, but in both cases 
the factional conflicts succeeded in sabotaging a competing faction’s standing, 
which, if unchecked, would have threatened the continued maintenance of the 
political leader’s networks of support. 
From the mid-1990s onwards, the BJP appeared to be more prone to severe 
factional infighting than the other two main parties in Uttar Pradesh. One factor 
already mentioned above contributing to this is the coexistence of a national and a 
state level leadership, whose interests might be at odds. A similar dichotomy is 
negligible in case of the BSP and completely absent in case of the SP. A second 
factor consists of the level of electoral support achieved by the BJP between 1996 
and 1998, which necessitated the accommodation of several political networks 
based on homogenous voting behaviour of specific communities such as Brahmins, 
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Thakurs, Lodhs, Kurmis and Banias, which provided more room for shifting 
political allegiances within the party. Under these circumstances, it is debatable 
whether parties in Uttar Pradesh are capable to maintain sufficient electoral support 
allowing simple majorities in the Legislative Assembly except over a short period. 
 
C O N C L U S I O N  
 
The analysis of factional conflicts within the BJP state unit and the process of 
coalition formation (and breakdown) in Uttar Pradesh show that political 
competition in this state is characterized mainly by the strategic flexibility of the 
political actors. Leaving aside the temptation to attribute this either to a (somewhat 
prolonged) transitional character of the present phase of political development, or 
to the continuing presence of social and/or economical backwardness, that prevents 
the transformation towards a stable and progressive party system corresponding to 
Western examples, this virtual lack of associational and ideological constraints on 
political competition can only be explained by reconsidering the assumptions 
underlying the rationality of political actors. 
It has been argued here, that the rationality of political competition both 
between and within parties in Uttar Pradesh is based on the strategic use of caste as 
a political tool by some communities. Community-based homogenous voting 
behaviour by some politically important communities provides a measure of 
stability in an otherwise rather chaotic political system based on the reciprocal 
exchange of votes for state largesse. Because of the fractured nature of UP’s 
society, electoral success rests on a politician’s ability to create and maintain 
electoral coalitions of social groups at the constituency level. These coalitions are 
linked through informal political networks to state level politics. 
The maintenance of the political networks depends to a large degree on the 
ability of political leaders to ensure the flow of rewards to second-rung politicians 
for their continued allegiance, while at the same time the informality of the 
networks offers significant incentives for defection, which allows ‘poaching’ and 
possibly even elimination of a rival’s support base. A linkage by reward can thus 
be seen especially at the sub-party level of politics. 
There are striking similarities between on the one hand the proposal of informal 
political networks, and a broad interpretation of Brass’ concept of factionalism on 
the other, if factions are not seen to be restricted to networks made up through 
personal allegiance. The argument for a re-evaluation of Brass’ concept here is 
mainly based on an analysis of the rationality of political competition in Uttar 
Pradesh. Fresh empirical evidence about the functioning of political networks and 
their state-level interaction, especially taking into consideration the strategic uses 
and organizational properties of castes as political entities and the role of rewards 
in creating and maintaining coalitions at the constituency level, is needed to 
provide sufficient information about the rationality of political competition in Uttar 
Pradesh. 
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